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Abstract
This paper tests how subjects behave in an intertemporal consumption/saving
experiment when borrowing is allowed and whether subjects treat debt differently
than savings. Two treatments create environments where either saving or borrow-
ing is required for optimal consumption. Since both treatments share the same
optimal consumption levels, actual consumption choices can be directly compared
across treatments. The experimental findings imply that deviations from opti-
mal behavior are higher when subjects have to borrow than when they have to
save in order to consume optimally, suggesting debt-aversion. Signifiant under-
consumption is observed when subjects have to borrow in order to reach optimal
consumption. Only weak evidence is found suggesting that subjects over-consume
when saving is necessary for optimal consumption.
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1 Introduction
The question how people cope with stochastic dynamic optimization problems, such
as posed by intertemporal consumption/savings problems, has been repeatedly tested
in economic experiments. An early reference is Hey and Dardanoni (1988). Ballinger
et al. (2003, 2011), Carbone and Hey (2004) as well as Brown et al. (2009) further
substantiate the experimental analysis of intertemporal consumption/saving problems.
The main finding of this literature is that subjects (somewhat unsurprisingly) deviate
from optimal behavior. In particular it is observed that subjects tend to over-consume
in early periods, i.e. save too little compared to the optimal solution and that consump-
tion tracks income too closely. When subjects are given the opportunity to learn (either
privately through repetition or socially through observing other life-cycle consumption
decisions) consumption decisions improve towards optimality. With the exception of
Fenig et al. (2013) all existing experimental studies on dynamic intertemporal con-
sumption/savings problems have strict borrowing constraints. This implies that only
one side of the problem has been examined, i.e. whether subjects save optimally. I
believe that the question whether individuals borrow optimally is of similar interest to
the understanding of intertemporal consumption decisions.1 The experiment conducted
for this paper addresses two main research questions: first, how do people behave in a
life-cycle consumption experiment when borrowing is allowed? Second, do people treat
savings systematically different than debt with respect to consumption smoothing?
The experiment is based on a simple discrete-time, finite horizon life-cycle model
of consumption with no discounting and no interest paid on savings or debt. In order
to compare borrowing and saving behavior this experiment has two treatments, one in
which the income stream has an increasing trend and one in which it has a decreasing
trend. Since the experimental environment creates an incentive to smooth consumption,
the optimal solution with an increasing income stream requires borrowing and the
optimal solution with a decreasing income stream requires saving. Moreover, since the
specifics of the underlying model were chosen in such a way that optimal consumption
is the same in both treatments, this allows to directly compare borrowing and saving
behavior. This is a novel feature compared to previous experimental work where mostly
1The experiment by Fenig et al. (2013) has no borrowing constraints. However they do not specifi-
cally analyze borrowing behavior, but introduce and analyze asset markets in an experimental general
equilibrium economy. In one treatment they find, however, that ruling out borrowing in order to buy
assets does not affect asset prices.
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stationary income processes are used, which does not allow for such a comparison.2
With an increasing income stream, the experimental data suggests that subjects sig-
nificantly underconsume, that is they do not borrow enough compared to the optimal
solution. This stands in contrast to evidence from previous experiments on intertem-
poral consumption/savings problems, where overconsumption is typically observed. In
line with previous findings, however, weak evidence is found for overconsumption in
the treatment with an increasing income stream, implying that subjects do not save
enough relative to the optimal solution. Comparing consumption decisions across treat-
ments reveals that deviations from optimal behavior are higher in the treatment with
an increasing income stream than in the treatment with a decreasing income stream.
This implies that subjects are less willing to borrow than to save in order to smooth
consumption, i.e. they are debt averse.
The experimental literature on intertemporal consumption/savings problems con-
centrates on two potential explanations for suboptimal behavior. One explanation is
bounded rationality or cognitive constraints. Ballinger et al. (2011) for example find
that cognitive abilities are the best predictors of saving performance. Moreover there
exists substantial evidence that subjects typically learn to improve their consumption
decisions over time. This points towards bounded rationality since with perfect rational-
ity there would be no room for improvement. In this experiment cognitive constraints
certainly explain some deviations from optimal behavior. However they cannot explain
systematic differences in deviations from optimal behavior in the two treatments of this
experiment, since the experimental task is equally demanding in both treatments. This
is because subjects face essentially the same optimization problem in both treatments,
as debt is mathematically equivalent to savings only with a different sign.
Another explanation for suboptimal behavior is a preference for immediacy or
present bias. Brown et al. (2009) use immediate rewards in an intertemporal consump-
tion/saving experiment. They find that behavior is consistent with both hyperbolic
discounting and dual self models and not with exponential discounting. In this exper-
iment, however, present bias should not play a role since subjects get their reward at
only one point in time – at the end of the experiment.
The existing literature on debt aversion primarily analyzes its role in the light of the
decision to invest in higher education. Eckel et al. (2007) use survey measures to assess
2Brown et al. (2009) use an income stream that is increasing in expectations. However, their
experiment also uses habit formation utility and therefore saving is optimal in early periods even with
an increasing income stream.
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debt aversion and relate this data to lottery choice experiments. They find that debt
aversion has little to no impact on the demand for loans for postsecondary education.
In field experiments, Field (2009) as well as Caetano et al. (2011) offer differently
labeled loan contracts to students and find that debt aversion does influence career and
education investment decisions. However, all these studies analyze debt aversion in the
context of student loans. This experiment offers a more general approach, allowing
to identify debt aversion in the context of a stochastic dynamic optimization problem,
which in one way or another serves as a basis for household behavior in most modern
macroeconomic models.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section provides the
theory and experimental design. Section 3 contains the data analysis and Section 4
concludes.
2 Theory and Experimental Design
The experiment described in the following section aims to implement a particular ver-
sion of the life-cycle model of consumption. One experimental life-cycle lasts for 20
periods. In each period t = (1, ..., 20), subjects decide how much to consume (ct), and
implicitly how much to save or borrow. There is no discounting and no interest is paid
on savings or debt. Period income yt follows a trend stationary stochastic process. The
intertemporal budget constraint requires period consumption plus period savings (at)
to equal period wealth, which is defined as wt = yt+at−1. Period savings are allowed to
be both positive and negative. In the last period, remaining wealth must be consumed,
i.e. saving for the (non-existent) next period is not possible. Initial savings a0 were
normalized to zero.3 Induced preferences are given by a time-separable CARA utility
function: u(ct) = 250(1 − e(−0.02ct)).4 The subjects’ objective was to choose consump-
tion in every period in order maximize the expected utility of life-time consumption.
3Note that together with the ending condition (a20 = 0), this also implies that total consumption
must equal total income:
∑20
t=1 ct =
∑20
t=1 yt.
4CARA utility was chosen because this class of utility functions is defined on the negative domain.
Why this is of importance will be explained later in this section. However, other papers in the literature
on life-cycle consumption/savings problems also make use of CARA utility. See, for instance Carbone
and Hey (2004)
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The decision problem subjects face at any period τ can be written as:
max
ct
Eτ
20∑
t=τ
u(ct) (1)
s.t. ct + at = wt, (2)
a20 = 0, a0 = 0. (3)
The solution method to this sort of problem is dynamic programming using backward
induction. The specifics of the decision problem were chosen in order to keep the prob-
lem as traceable as possible for subjects without making it trivial. However, the solution
is still computationally difficult. Usually dynamic stochastic optimization problems like
the one introduced above have no analytical solution. In particular, due to the finite
horizon of the optimization problem, the solution cannot be simplified by exploiting the
property of stationarity. The solution to this particular optimization problem was im-
plemented numerically using the software Mathematica and following Carroll’s (2009)
solution methods for dynamic stochastic optimization problems. Without going into
detail, optimal consumption policy functions for every period were calculated via back-
ward induction, as functions of period wealth. With these policy functions optimal
consumption levels were calculated starting from the first period and then iterating
forward.
The experiment has two base treatments that differ only with respect to the in-
come process. In one treatment the income process is increasing over time, in the
other one it is decreasing. Intuitively, the optimal solution with an increasing income
process includes borrowing (a < 0) whereas with a decreasing income process saving
(a > 0) is necessary for optimal consumption. Therefore I will refer to the treatment
with the increasing income stream as the Borrowing treatment and to the treatment
with a decreasing income stream as the Saving treatment. The income process for the
Borrowing treatment is given by: yBt = 10t + θt, where θt takes the values of +10 or
-10, each with probability of one half. For the Saving treatment the income process
is: ySt = 210 − 10t + θt. Note that the expected lifetime income over 20 periods is
equal across treatments. Since the stochastic component is equivalent at any time for
both treatments and income can be shifted costlessly across periods, this implies that
optimal consumption plans are equivalent in both treatments. The experimental design
therefore allows to directly compare consumption behavior in both treatments (between
5
subject) and thus to examine whether there exist systematic differences between saving
and borrowing behavior.
In order to assess learning effects, the experiment is repeated for six experimental
life cycles (rounds), with different income realizations in each round. Subjects first
play three repetitions of either the Borrowing or the Saving treatment. After three
repetitions roles are changed. Subjects who started with the Borrowing treatment now
play three repetitions of the Saving treatment and vice versa.5 This role change was
implemented in order to analyze whether subjects are able to transfer their learning
from one treatment to the other. Moreover, it adds a within subject dimension to the
analysis of the treatment effect. In the following I will refer to the condition that starts
with the Borrowing treatment as Borrowing First (BF) and to the condition that starts
with the Saving treatment as Saving First (SF).
Note that the CARA utility function used in this experiment is defined on the
negative domain. In fact, negative consumption was and had to be possible in order to
enforce borrowing. However, since income is always positive, negative consumption is
never part of the optimal solution. The fact that out of 9120 consumption decisions only
24 or 0.3% were negative, illustrates that this was generally understood by the subjects.
How negative consumption was explained to subjects is part of the next subsection.
2.1 Experimental Procedures
The experiment was programmed and conducted with the software z-Tree (Fischbacher
2007). Consumption was explained to the subjects as buying “points” by spending
“Taler”, the experimental currency in which income was denoted. Experimental currency
was converted to points by the utility function specified above. Subjects were informed
about the exact form of the utility function. Furthermore they were given a graph
of the function and a table with relevant function values. The advantage of framing
consumption as buying points is that negative consumption can be explained as the
selling of points in return for experimental currency.
Consumption decisions were input in an interface that displayed period income,
savings from the last period along with the history of all previous decisions and relevant
values, such as savings, wealth, the number of purchased points, and accumulated
points. Before a consumption decision was implemented, subjects were informed about
5Subjects did not know about the role change when playing the first three repetitions. They received
new instructions after the third round.
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how their chosen consumption level translates into points and the amount of savings
that would be available in the next period. After this information was displayed subjects
had the opportunity to start over, i.e. specify another potential level of consumption,
and check the implications of that consumption level. In the final period of each life
cycle, the program automatically spent that period’s wealth as consumption. At any
period during the experiment, subjects knew about the amount of points purchased so
far in the current round. At the end of every round subjects were again informed about
the amount of points they purchased during the round. At the end of the experiment,
two of the six experimental life cycles were randomly chosen to be payoff relevant, one
from the first three life cycles and one from the last three life cycles. Subjects’ payoffs
were determined by a preannounced linear function of the amount of points purchased
in the two relevant rounds. The minimal payoff was fixed at 5e. Subjects earned an
average of 19.23e.
The experiment was conducted at the laboratory of the Technical University of
Berlin. A total of 76 subjects participated, 38 in the Borrowing First condition and 38
in the Saving First condition. Most of the subjects were undergraduate students in the
field of economics or engineering.
3 Results
The analysis of consumption decisions in the experiment is split into three subsections.
In subsection 3.1, I will compare observed consumption and saving decisions to optimal
consumption. There are two ways to measure deviations from optimal behavior. Actual
consumption levels can be compared to consumption levels that would be optimal,
given a subject has always behaved optimally in the past, i.e. has optimal wealth
levels in any period. I will refer to this consumption level as unconditionally optimal
consumption. Another way is to compare actual consumption levels to the consumption
level that would be optimal given the actual wealth levels that subjects have at the
considered period of the experiment. This wealth level can deviate from the wealth
level that would be optimal given the income realizations, if subjects have not behaved
optimally in the past. I will refer to this consumption level as conditionally optimal
consumption. Like Carbone and Hey (2004), I will make use of both concepts, however
I prefer the latter one for the following reason: an error made in one period causes the
wealth level in the following period to deviate from the unconditionally optimal level.
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Since optimal consumption is a function of present wealth, optimal consumption in
the next period will also deviate from unconditional optimal consumption. An optimal
response to the present wealth level in the next period would thus be counted as a
deviation from unconditionally optimal behavior. Furthermore, an error made in any
period causes optimal consumption to deviate from unconditionally optimal levels in
all following periods, even if a subject behaved optimally from that period onwards.
Comparing actual consumption levels to unconditionally optimal levels therefore results
in a multiple counting of one error and thus leading to a disproportionate weighting of
early errors compared to later errors.
In subsection 3.2, I will discuss the theoretical implications of myopia in this ex-
periment and estimate subjects’ apparent planning horizons. In subsection 3.3, I will
examine learning effects, i.e. whether subjects improve their decisionmaking over the 6
experimental life cycles.
3.1 Deviations from Optimal Behavior
I will start by analyzing directional deviations from optimal consumption, i.e. whether
subjects consume too much or too little compared to optimal consumption.6 A measure
for directional deviations from optimal consumption used by Ballinger et al. (2003) is
given by Measure 1: m1 =
∑20
t=1(c
∗
t (wt) − ct), where c∗t (wt) is conditionally optimal
consumption (depending on current wealth wt) and ct is observed consumption in period
t. This is the sum of deviations from conditionally optimal consumption for one subject
and over one experimental life-cycle. For the sake of legibility I omit indices for subjects
and rounds. Figure 1 provides a graphical representation of the median measure m1
of all subjects from the BF condition (solid line) and the SF condition (dashed line)
for rounds 1 to 6.7 The grey error bars represent the 95% confidence intervals (from a
Wilcoxon signed-rank test).
Whenever subjects faced an increasing income stream, i.e. in round 1 to 3 in the
BF condition, as well as in round 4 to 6 in the SF condition, m1 is significantly positive.
This implies that subjects on average consume less than optimal in each of these rounds.
Note that this result is contrary to previous experimental studies, where subjects are
6Note that consumption and savings are two sides of one coin: a subject who consumes too little
also saves too much and vice versa.
7I use the median as a descriptive statistic because I use non-parametric tests, such as the Mann-
Whitney U Test to compare treatments. These tests typically provide information about the median
of a random sample.
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Figure 1: median aggregate deviation from conditional optimal consumption. Solid and dashed
lines represent median values from the BF and SF condition respectively.
found to consume too much relative to optimal levels. A potential explanation could be
that with an increasing income stream, borrowing is necessary for optimal consumption.
Since previous experimental studies did not allow borrowing, their findings might not
hold for borrowing behavior. The evidence is not as clear concerning deviations from
optimality when subjects face a decreasing income stream, i.e. in round 1 to 3 in
the SF condition and in round 4 to 6 in the BF condition. All median m1 values
are negative, however only three of them significantly so. This implies that subjects
(weakly) overconsume relative to optimal levels, which is in line with previous findings.
The measure introduced above gives account of whether subjects mostly consume
more or less than is optimal throughout one experimental life-cycle. However, it is not
a very good measure of performance, since it potentially conceals suboptimal behavior.
This is the case, for instance, when positive and negative deviations cancel each other
out over one experimental life-cycle. Even though the median deviation is close to zero,
as observed in rounds 1 to 3 in the SF condition, behavior might still be far from optimal.
Therefore I also examine absolute deviations from conditional optimal behavior by use
of Measure 2, m2 =
∑t=1
20 |c∗t (wt)− ct|. Figure 2(a) illustrates the evolution of Measure
9
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(a) Median aggregate absolute deviations
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(b) Median Utility Loss
Figure 2: Median aggregate absolute deviations from conditionally optimal consumption and
Median utility loss. Solid and dashed lines represent median values from the BF and SF
condition respectively.
2 over the six experimental life-cycles. Again, the solid line represents the median m2
over all subjects in the BF condition and the dashed line represents the median m2 over
all subjects in the SF condition.8 The median levels of m2 are higher when subjects face
an increasing income stream than when they face a decreasing income stream. This
relationship is significant for the first three rounds (p-values from a Mann-Whitney U
test are provided in Table 1). This suggests that absolute deviations from conditionally
optimal behavior are higher when subjects have to borrow in order to consume optimally
than when they have to save in order to consume optimally.
As discussed in Section 2, all subjects observe the same income shock realizations
over the course of the experiment. Furthermore subjects from both the BF and SF con-
dition share the same unconditional optimal consumption levels at any period and round
during the experiment. Therefore I can directly compare deviations from unconditional
optimal behavior across treatments. Measure 3 is m3 =
∑20
t=1(u(c
∗
t (w
∗
t ))−u(ct)), where
c∗t (w
∗
t ) denotes unconditionally optimal consumption at period t as a function of opti-
mal wealth w∗t . This measure can be interpreted as the utility loss that results from
8Note that for Measure 1 and Measure 2, conditional optimal consumption is the only meaningful
benchmark. With unconditionally optimal consumption as a benchmark this measure would always
be zero, since
∑20
t=1 c
∗
t (w
∗
t ) =
∑20
t=1 ct, where c
∗
t (w
∗
t ) denotes unconditionally optimal consumption at
period t as a function of optimal wealth w∗t , always holds.
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suboptimal consumption in one experimental life-cycle. Using conditionally optimal
consumption utility as a benchmark yields similar results, however the interpretation is
not as straightforward. Figure 2(b) summarizes the median utility loss for the BF and
SF conditions. Similar to the previous results, utility loss is higher for subjects in the
Borrowing treatments compared to subjects in the Saving treatments. This difference
is significant in rounds one and three and marginally significant (p=0.058) in round
two.9
Summing up, the data suggests that there are substantial deviations from opti-
mal behavior. In particular, subjects consume less than is optimal when they face an
increasing income stream. Only weak evidence exists for overconsumption when the
income stream is decreasing. There appears to be a difference in deviations between
the Borrowing and Saving treatments. Deviations from optimal consumption are higher
in the Borrowing treatment than in the Saving treatment. This implies that subjects
are less willing to borrow than they are willing to save in order to smooth consumption.
3.2 Myopia
Some authors suggest that sub-optimal consumption choices can be explained with
myopia, a particular form of bounded rationality. In order to behave optimally in this
experiment, subjects have to solve a backward induction problem that has 20 induction
steps. Since this is a very complex problem it comes as no surprise that subjects fail
to behave optimally. Ballinger et al. (2003) suggest that subjects may not take the
whole experimental time horizon in account, but simplify the problem by shortening
their planning horizon, i.e. they act as if only h periods remain. In this experiment,
the short-horizon (myopic) optimal solution generally deviates from the full horizon
optimal solution, unless the remaining periods are less or equal the planning horizon.
Myopia is an appealing model of behavior since it can not only explain deviations
from optimal behavior, but in this experimental environment also makes clear predic-
tions concerning the direction of deviations from optimal behavior. Myopic subjects
should over-consume in the Saving treatment and under-consume in the Borrowing
treatment. In the Saving treatment, a shorter planning horizon implies that subjects
do not take later periods into account, where income is lower. Hence they underestimate
9Subjects may perceive the role change after round three to reveal new information about the
structure and purpose of the experiment, which may lead them to reconsider their strategy. Therefore,
the fact that the differences in m2 and m3 seize to be significant after the role change is not overly
surprising.
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Round
measure condition 1 2 3 4 5 6
median m1 BF 922.323 932.144 890.734 -67.704 -290.327 -260.765
SF -133.471 -90.488 -89.290 929.913 940.457 761.357
mean m1 BF 1047.17 860.227 790.387 -168.05 -236.162 -246.414
SF -6.668 31.040 -68.498 848.954 838.205 676.664
<0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01
median m2 BF 935.539 938.128 923.855 646.596 525.661 369.850
SF 704.687 466.496 269.237 931.966 941.558 827.562
mean m2 BF 1183.6 936.5 884.476 721.94 628.343 600.024
SF 875.578 737.92 590.045 906.195 942.792 798.939
0.017 <0.01 <0.01 0.19 0.102 0.226
median m3 BF 468.003 492.493 489.941 260.467 212.786 171.035
SF 254.895 181.871 113.383 457.953 544.64 476.158
mean m3 BF 2993.83 547.786 491.923 412.377 323.953 337.165
SF 674.768 379.117 302.58 494.125 545.743 479.995
0.041 0.058 <0.01 0.445 0.144 0.403
median h∗ BF 4 4 6 20 18 19
SF 19.5 18.5 20 4.5 6 9
mean h∗ BF 6.711 7.263 8.711 13.684 12.842 14.316
SF 13.921 13.895 14.711 8.105 9.605 10.184
<0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 0.057 0.029
Table 1: Measures 1-3 and apparent planning horizon h∗. P-values come from a Mann-Whitney
Test and are printed in italic letters. The null hypothesis is that samples are stochastically
equivalent.
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the need to save for later periods and consume more than is optimal. Analogously, in
the Borrowing treatment a shorter planning horizon implies that later, higher income
periods are neglected. Hence, myopic individuals do not borrow enough and therefore
consume less than is optimal.
As discussed earlier, significant underconsumption is observed in the Borrowing
treatment and weak evidence is found for overconsumption in the Saving treatment.
Myopia can furthermore explain certain differences in deviations from conditional op-
timal behavior between the Borrowing and the Saving treatment. In particular, when
a positive income shock occurs, the absolute deviation from (full horizon) optimal be-
havior of a myopic agent will be higher in the Borrowing treatment than in the Saving
treatment. Vice versa, when a negative income shock occurs, the deviation is higher
in the Saving treatment than in the Borrowing treatment.10 One of the main results
from subsection 3.1 is that deviations from optimal behavior are higher for subjects in
the Borrowing treatment than for subjects in the Saving treatment. It therefore seems
necessary to examine whether this result can be explained by myopia. To address this
issue I estimate the subjects’ apparent planning horizons and check whether planning
horizons are consistent across treatments. The apparent planning horizon is estimated
as h∗ = argminh∈{1,...,20}
∑20
t=1(c
M
t (wt, h)− ct)2, where cMt (wt, h) is conditional optimal
(myopic) consumption given the planning horizon h.11 The adopted approach of esti-
mating the planning horizon is identical to that of Ballinger et al. (2003) and has since
been used repeatedly in the literature on life-cycle consumption experiments.12 Figure
3 illustrates the median estimated planning horizons. Estimated planning horizons are
lower in the Borrowing treatments than in the Saving treatments. This difference is
significant at the 5% level for five rounds and marginally significant for the remaining
round (p = 0.057). This result is particularly interesting since there exists no a-priori
reason for subjects to have different planning horizons in the different treatments. If
Myopia was the explanation for the observed deviations from optimality, this expla-
nation should be independent of the treatment, and therefore one should observe a
planning horizon that is similar across treatments. This is clearly not the case.
Summing up, while myopia can explain certain characteristics of the experimental
data, it fails to consistently explain observed behavior in this experiment. There is no
10The appendix contains an example that illustrates how myopia affects deviations from full horizon
optimal behavior.
11I also estimated h∗ using absolute deviations instead of squared deviations. The results are almost
identical.
12see, for instance, Carbone and Hey (2004), Ballinger et al. (2011)
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Figure 3: Estimated planning horizons. Solid and dashed lines represent median values from
the BF and SF condition respectively
a-priori reason why planning horizons should differ across treatments, since subjects are
randomly assigned to treatments. This suggests that some other factor, not captured
by the concept of myopia (e.g. debt aversion) drives behavior and causes the difference
in estimated planning horizons.
3.3 Learning
In order to assess whether subjects are able to improve their consumption decisions over
time, I look at within subject differences in the absolute deviations from conditional
optimal consumption (Measure 2) across rounds. Table 2 summarizes the median dif-
ferences in measure m2 between consecutive rounds as well as to the first round. The
difference between round r and the first round is denoted by m12 − mr2 and the dif-
ference between two consecutive rounds is denoted by mr−12 − mr2. There appears to
be a constant improvement of consumption decisions in the BF condition. All median
differences between two consecutive rounds are positive and most of these differences
14
Round
measure condition 1 2 3 4 5 6
median mr−12 −mr2 BF NA 58.214 18.725 69.421 98.312 19.978
<0.001 0.057 0.020 0.003 0.229
median m12 −mr2 NA 58.214 137.063 370.405 439.458 575.825
<0.001 0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001
median mr−12 −mr2 SF NA 66.612 80.909 -202.804 62.481 54.186
0.001 0.001 <0.001 0.143 0.007
median m12 −mr2 NA 66.612 155.412 -40.330 37.355 69.895
0.001 <0.001 0.408 0.750 0.376
Table 2: Learning. P-values are printed in italic letters and come from a Wilcoxon signed-rank
test. The null hypothesis is that the median difference between the pairs is zero.
are significant. Moreover, all rounds show significant improvement in comparison to the
first round. One has to be careful, however, when comparing data from two different
treatments, i.e. data from the first three rounds and data from the second three rounds.
Differences in behavior can be caused by both learning and the treatment effect.13 The
significant improvement of consumption decisions between round 3 and 4 is therefore
probably caused by a combination of learning and the treatment effect.
In the SF condition, consumption decisions improve from round 1 to 2 and from
round 2 to 3 before they significantly deteriorate between rounds 3 and 4. After round
3 the differences to the first round are not significantly different from zero, implying
no improvement in comparison to the first period. Again both learning and treatment
effect play a role here. Generally one would expect the learning effect to positively
influence consumption decisions. However, the overall effect between rounds 3 and 4
is significantly negative. This implies that the treatment effect is negative and that it
dominates the learning effect.
Note that when comparing rounds 3 and 4 the within subject effect is the same as
in the between subject analysis in Section 3.1. When changing from the Borrowing
to Saving treatment there is an improvement of consumption decisions (even though
here it is not possible to discriminate between the learning and the treatment effect)
13The treatment effect here is the change of the income process, which determines whether saving
or borrowing is necessary for optimal consumption.
15
and when changing from the Saving to Borrowing treatment consumption decisions
deteriorate.
Overall these findings imply that subjects generally learn and improve their con-
sumption decisions over time. However, experience does not seem to eliminate the
treatment effect. Even after three periods of learning in the Saving First condition,
consumption decisions markedly deteriorate when subjects have to borrow in order to
consume optimally. In other words: the finding that subjects perform worse when
they have to borrow in order to consume optimally compared to when they have to
save in order to consume optimally, prevails even after subjects learn to improve their
decisionmaking, i.e. learn to smooth consumption.
4 Discussion
With the experiment presented in this paper I am able to assess saving behavior as
well as borrowing behavior in a dynamic optimization context. Previous experiments
on life-cycle consumption problems done by others find a general tendency for subjects
to save too little. This study suggests that this result does not hold when borrowing
is allowed and necessary for optimal consumption. In this experiment, the direction
of deviations from optimal behavior is context specific. There exists weak evidence
that subjects save too little and consume too much (relative to conditionally optimal
consumption) when the income stream is decreasing and saving is necessary for optimal
consumption. Subjects borrow too little and thus consume too little when the income
stream is increasing and borrowing is necessary for optimal consumption. Furthermore,
the experimental data suggests that deviations from optimal behavior are higher when
subjects have to borrow than when they have to save in order to reach optimal con-
sumption. This implies that subjects are less willing to engage in debt than in savings,
i.e. they are debt-averse. Similar to other experiments on intertemporal consump-
tion/savings problems, learning is observed here. However, subjects seem to be unable
to transfer what they have learned in the Saving treatment to the Borrowing treatment.
In fact, consumption decisions significantly deteriorate after the role change from the
Saving to the Borrowing treatment, suggesting that the effect that debt aversion has
on consumption decisions prevails even after three rounds of experience.
Often stated reasons in the literature for sub-optimal consumption choices are
bounded rationality, in particular limited planning horizons (or myopia), as well as
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time-inconsistent preferences. Myopia is an appealing model of behavior, because it
can explain overconsumption with a decreasing income stream and underconsumption
with an increasing income stream. However, myopia cannot explain the asymmetry
between deviations from optimal consumption with an increasing and with a decreas-
ing income stream. This intuition is confirmed by the fact that significantly different
apparent planning horizons are estimated in the different treatments. Since one would
expect planning horizons to be equally distributed in both treatments, this implies
that myopia alone cannot explain the observed differences in behavior. Other forms of
computational constraints, e.g. “cost of thinking”, may explain deviations from opti-
mal behavior but not the difference in behavior across treatments. This is because the
difficulty of the optimization problem is the same in both treatments, as debt is math-
ematically equivalent to savings, only with a different sign. Present biased preferences
cannot serve as an explanation for the deviations from optimality either. Subjects in
this experiment get their (monetary) reward at only one point in time, which is after
the experiment. It seems unlikely that some form of present bias affects consump-
tion decisions during the experiment since there exist no immediate rewards. Brown
et al. (2009) use sips of water as immediate rewards for thirsty subjects to emulate an
intertemporal consumption/savings environment where present biased preferences can
play a role. A simple β − δ model of discounting would predict that agents facing an
increasing income stream would borrow too much, which is opposite to the findings in
this paper. Analyzing which effect dominates, present bias or debt aversion, appears
to be a promising future research project.
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Appendix
A Myopia and deviations from optimal behavior
Example 1: Assume we are in the first period of the 20-period life-cycle consumption
environment described in Section 2. Further assume that the decisionmaker is myopic
and has a planning horizon of 2, that is when making a decision she acts as if the the
next period is the final period. Myopic optimal consumption cM in period 1 follows
from the two-period optimization problem:
cM = argmax
c1
[u(c1) + u(y1 − c1 + E[y2])] (4)
As explained in Section 3, different optimal myopic consumption levels arise in the
different treatments. Since optimal consumption is a function of period wealth, optimal
consumption levels also depend on the income shock. Long-term (fully rational) optimal
consumption only depends on the income shock and does not differ between treatments.
1. Borrowing treatment (increasing income stream): Short-term (myopic)
optimal consumption is:
cMB =
9.503 if y1 = 0 (negative income shock)19.503 if y1 = 20 (positive income shock) (5)
2. Saving treatment (decreasing income stream): Short-term (myopic) opti-
mal consumption is:
cMS =
189.503 if y1 = 190 (negative income shock)199.503 if y1 = 210 (positive income shock) (6)
Long-term optimal consumption does not differ between treatments and is given by:
cL =
104.322 with negative income shock105.322 with positive income shock (7)
It is straight-forward to see that deviations from long-term optimal behavior caused
by myopia are higher in the Borrowing treatment than in the Saving treatment when
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an negative income shock occurs:
δnegB = 104.322− 9.503 = 94.819 > δnegS = 189.503− 104.322 = 85.181. (8)
Analogously, with a positive income shock deviations in the Saving treatment are higher
than in the Borrowing treatment:
δposB = 105.322− 19.503 = 85.819 < δposS = 199.503− 105.322 = 94.181. (9)
B Instructions
This section contains the instructions of the experiment.14 The first part of the in-
structions were given to subjects in a printed handout and were read aloud by the
experimenter. The second part was handed out to subjects when they finished the
third round. Subjects in the different conditions received different instructions. The
instructions printed here were used for subjects from the Borrowing First condition.
Instructions (Part 1)
The experiment you are participating today is part of a research project. It is meant
to analyze economic decisionmaking. The rules and instructions are the same for every
participant. Your payoff depends on your decisions during the experiment. Please read
the instructions carefully. You are not allowed to talk and exchange information with
other participants during the experiment. Please raise your hand if you have a question.
An Experimenter will then come to your place and answer your question. Please don’t
ask your questions out loud. Should you break one of these rules we are obliged to
exclude you from participation.
Overview. First you will have time to read the instructions. After that we will go
through the instructions together and you answer a quiz in order to make sure you
understood the instructions. After that you may ask questions, before the experiment
starts. After the experiment you will be asked to fill out a short questionaire.
14The instructions printed here are a translation of the original German version.
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The experiment consists of 6 rounds, each of which consists of 20 periods. The
duration of the experiment is around 1.5 hours. Instructions, quiz and questionaire will
take around 30 minutes. The remaining hour is dedicated to the actual experiment. In
every period a countdown of 30 seconds will be displayed. You may take more or less
time to reach your decision. The countdown is meant to provide some indication how
much time you can take in every period to finish the experiment in one hour. You may
finish the experiment even if you play for more than one hour.
The following instructions are for the first three rounds of the experiment. After
three rounds the experiment stops and you will be asked to type in a password. You
will be handed new instructions for the following 3 rounds, containing the password
needed to continue with the experiment. After the last round your experiment payoff
will be displayed. Please raise you hand when you have finished the last period. You
will then be handed a short survey. After filling out the survey, please raise your hand
again. You will then be given your experiment payoff.
You are playing an “investment game” and decide in every period how many points
you want to purchase. The sum of all points purchased in one round is that period’s
result. Your payoff depends the results from two randomly drawn rounds.
Income, Savings and Wealth. In every period you obtain a certain income, de-
noted in the experimental currency “Taler”. Your task is to choose how many taler to
spend in order to purchase points. Thereby you (implicitly) also choose how many Taler
you want to save or borrow. The difference between income and spending in one period
are called savings. At any period in the experiment, your wealth is defined as the sum
of savings from all previous periods. This implies that savings from one period added
to the wealth in this period yields the wealth in next period. Please note that the sign
of the savings can be both positive and negative. In case you decide to spend less Taler
than you have as income, your savings have a positive sign. In this case your wealth in
the next period is your waltz in this period plus the absolute amount of savings in this
period. Should you decide to spend more Taler than you have as income, your savings
have a negative sign. In this case your wealth in the next period is your wealth in this
period minus the absolute amount of savings.
Example: assume your income in one period is 50 Taler and you spend 30 Taler to
purchase points. Your savings are then 20 Taler. In case you instead spend 70 Taler
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with the same income, your savings are -20 Taler. In the first case your wealth in the
next period is the wealth in this period plus 20 Taler. In the latter case your wealth in
the next period is this period’s wealth minus 20 Taler.
Your wealth may take positive or negative values as well, depending on whether your
savings from previous periods were positive or negative. Your wealth in the first period
is 0 Taler. In the last period, your wealth plus income will be spent automatically in
order to purchase points. This implies that the sum of Taler spent in all periods of one
round equals the sum of income obtained in all periods of this round. In other words:
you may spend more or less than your income in one round. However, over one round,
the sum of income always equals the sum of Taler spent.
Determination of Income. Income is randomly determined and follows the random
process:
yt = 10t+ t
The index “t” denotes the periods for which income is determined. Since the slope
of the process is 10, it has a positive trend. The expected income is therefore increasing
over time. t is the random part of the process and can be either +10 or -10, both
occurring with equal probability of 50%. Since 6 is either +10 or -10, your income in
period 6 is either 70 or 50. Since one round consists of 20 periods, income in the last
period will either be 210 or 190. It is very important to understand that t is truly
randomly determined. Which value t takes in one period does not depend on which
vales it had in previous periods or how you behaved in previous periods.
Taler and Points. Your task to decide in every period how many Taler you want to
spend in order to purchase points. Taler are transformed to points as follows:
Points = 250(1− e−0.02∗(chosen amount of Taler))
A graph of this function, as well as a table with relevant function values is attached
to the instructions. Please note that the above function is defined on the positive as well
as the negative domain. If you choose to spend a negative amount of Taler, you receive
a negative amount of points. In this case you “sell” points and gain Taler. Should your
wealth plus income in the last period be negative, you will have to automatically sell
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points in order to make sure that your Taler account is balanced.
Payoff. Your payoff depends on the results from two randomly drawn rounds. One
round is randomly drawn from the first three rounds and the other is randomly drawn
from the second three rounds. Your payoff is calculated as follows:
Payoff in Euro =
(Result1− 3000) + (Result2− 3000)
100
where Result1 is the first randomly drawn result and Result2 is the second randomly
drawn result.
Example: suppose the first randomly drawn result is 4300 points and the second
randomly drawn result is 3800 points. Your payoff is then:
(4300− 3000) + (3800− 3000)
100
=
1300 + 800
100
= 21e.
Quiz and Questions. You will now be asked to answer a short Quiz regarding the
contents of these instructions. In case you have questions after that, please raise your
hand. An experimenter will then come to you and answer your question.
Instructions (Part 2)
In the following three rounds the random process that determines your income will
change. Therefore, compared to the first part of the instructions, only the paragraph
“Determination of Income” changes. The rest of the instructions is still valid.
Determination of Income. Income is randomly determined and follows the random
process:
yt = 210t− t
The index “t” denotes the periods for which income is determined. Since the slope of
the process is -10, it has a negative trend. The expected income is therefore decreasing
over time. t is the random part of the process and can be either +10 or -10, both
occurring with equal probability of 50%. Since 6 is either +10 or -10, your income in
period 6 is either 140 or 160. Since one round consists of 20 periods, income in the
last period will either be 20 or 0. It is very important to understand that t is truly
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randomly determined. Which value t takes in one period does not depend on which
vales it had in previous periods or how you behaved in previous periods.
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